

With sincere regards.

WHAT IS HAPPENING TO OUR TRADITIONS?


The Opening Address to the University
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WHAT IS HAPPENING TO OUR TRADITIONS?

We are living at a time when many of the familiar pleasantries of academic life have less than their usual meaning. I shall hope to become a creditor by the gratitude of the new class by making any formal welcome I am supposed to extend to them this morning as matter-of-fact as possible. Our recruit may not be a veteran, but he is entitled at least to consider himself a soldier as soon as he dons the uniform. Those of us who have seen the University outgrow the present science building, the annex, the terrace, and borrowed rooms wherever we could get them, now share with you the novelty of grateful satisfaction with regard to our really comfortable accommodation in these buildings. After all there is nothing which you desire more than to merge into the student body and to become indistinguishable in the common work of the University; and if you will allow me to make one slight reservation, that is what we also desire for you.

The reservation is this: that in your mental outlook there is very probably a certain element of hopefulness, of expectancy, untouched as yet by any misgivings; and this we hope you will not too willingly resign to sophistication or give up without a struggle. Your idealism may not all be well-considered; but that part of it which is sound will be found, I think, to depend not only upon your surroundings but upon yourselves. They say that in crossing the Rocky Mountains the distant prospect from the prairie is almost imperceptibly lost among the rolling foot-hills and in the more imminent grandeur of the mountains themselves. We could wish you even among the foot-hills to retain something of that distant vision. This is an age when we are all confronted with

changing conditions. The qualities you would be well advised to conserve in your mental outlook are those, I am sure, that we should be well advised to conserve in ours.

The subject of one's thoughts at such a time as this can scarcely wander very far from the topic which is uppermost in the minds of all of us. Even if one were to seek a theme remote from the war, I know well that in listening you would only be correlating in your own minds anything I could say with this one pervading reality. Even with regard to the war itself, as the casualty lists come in one could prefer, as far as public discussion is concerned, to give way to a certain sense of futility, if it were not that the whole world is marching past, and whether we know it or not we shall be a changed nation. There seems no escape, in fact, at one time or another, from a reconsideration, on the one hand of much that we have been taking for granted, and on the other of many of the remedies which are being prescribed in some haste for real or imaginary evils. The process of readjustment, it may be, will last longer than most of us imagine, and perhaps it has already gone, consciously or otherwise, farther than most of us are willing to concede. I do not flatter myself that the thoughts you will hear me try to express this morning are new thoughts about the old conditions. One is concerned rather with the old thoughts in the light of new conditions. There may have been a time when we hoped to resume, when this war is over, something of the quiet ways of life we knew two years ago. That, we now know, can never be done. We not only *know* that, if we are thoughtful men and women, but we *feel* it. In fact if we feel it as deeply as we ought, we shall be very modest in our preconceived opinions, very chary about our prophecies, very humble in the presence of these far-reaching but as yet almost indeterminable changes. It is very easy, with regard to the distant future, to be a prophet; it would be very difficult, I am sure, under present conditions to be a true prophet.

May I try to illustrate the complexity of these conditions? It must seem to any thoughtful citizen one of

the most remarkable things in our political life, how suddenly and almost imperceptibly—and yet how decidedly—the public opinion which in the end controls a democracy sometimes forms itself into accomplished fact. To the casual observer it would almost appear that the electorate in a mass had made up its mind over night. It is worth reflection, at such a time as this, that this almost imperceptible process is now going on under conditions—is largely determined in fact by conditions—which we believe to be abnormal and unnatural. We believe that war is reactionary and uncivilized; yet as a nation we are being compelled to be reactionary, and we are being so, it must be admitted, not without success. That is, with regard to civilization as we understand it, we have lost the initiative, to use a military phrase; we are being compelled to conform for the present to the principles, not of John Bright or of Adam Smith, but of the Great Elector, of Frederick the Great, of Bismarck and of Treitschke; and we have come to see that while such conditions do or may exist, we must submit in practice to modifications in our democracy which we might never have countenanced in time of lasting peace. And if this stimulus which we call abnormal and unnatural and reactionary is likely to continue after openly declared warfare has come to an end—and there seems appallingly little to indicate that it will not, if the attitude of the most peace-loving administration of the most peace-loving republic in the world may be taken as a reliable indication—then our development in the immediate future may tend to be determined largely not by the peaceful ideal but by the vitally practicable; not by whether it is “reactionary” or not but by whether it is necessary or not. It would be a prospect to make one very reflective if even our own victory in arms were to become after all a victory for Frederick the Great, and if we were compelled to surrender the intellectual or moral initiative for a whole generation in order to fight the Germany of the mind, and to obtain what in our easy-going way before the war we thought might almost be taken for granted.

This problem of a workable internationalism is suggested merely as one of the challenges which a consistent democratic civilization cannot evade. Or to take another instance; in the magnificent organization of British industries for purposes of war there has been an impetus which cannot be ignored towards state control. One reflects here again that the stimulus to self-sacrifice and co-operation is now admittedly abnormal, and that we have yet in times of peace to evolve in that sense a moral substitute for war. Through such artificial conditions as these we are moving, unconsciously perhaps, towards a mental outlook which may become, before we are aware, substantial and predominant for our generation. It may not then be easy to orientate that mental outlook with regard to our democratic development hitherto. I have tried to suggest a less pretentious inquiry. What is happening now to our traditions—our political traditions and our intellectual outlook in the more restricted field of education?

OUR POLITICAL TRADITIONS

This stimulus to change and uncertainty reacts first of all, one may suppose, in accentuating the natural temper of the individual mind. There is much suggestive raillery in what our friend Willis sings in *Iolanthe*:

I often think it's comical
How Nature always does contrive
That every boy and every gal
That's born into this world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.

In reality is it not true that every man is in himself both a little Liberal and a little Conservative, in the sense that his response to certain impulses is more largely than we think dependent upon circumstances and environment? He may be impressed with the achievements of

the past but uninspired by the promise of the future; he may be gifted with sound judgement and a sense of humour (which includes a number of qualities which we usually dignify with more pretentious names) but while alive to extravagances he may be a little forgetful of inconsistencies; at his worst he may be unresponsive to new ideas or indeed to ideals at all; he may be unmoved by injustice and frankly resigned to a placid and profitable self-interest. On the other hand he may be uninspired by a past in which blunders seem to predominate; he may be sanguine of an untried future, impressed by the recent splendours of human achievement; he may be profoundly trustful of the aptitudes of men wisely to govern themselves, and profoundly distrustful, as most of us are, of their capacity, as a vested right, justly to govern others; he may be prone to discard experience for indiscriminate optimism; he may be impatient, as most of us are, of the blunders of classes or of individuals in the past, but infinitely patient of very elementary experiments in the present. He may be so responsive to ideals that he may become contemptuous of commonplaces, forgetful that eighty per cent of life is made up of the patient recognition of the obvious and the commonplace. He may be apt to discount ignorance and to dogmatize upon catchwords.

Such a range of aptitudes is not to be found, it is to be hoped, in one individual; but though the vagaries of the individual may be an unknown quantity, the aptitudes of seven millions of individuals in the aggregate, the statistician tells us, may be discussed with a much nearer approach to precision and definiteness. It would be impossible, even with the most intimate knowledge of an individual, to determine whether or not he will commit suicide by jumping over London Bridge; but the statistician can suggest with reasonable accuracy how many individuals in London are likely to commit suicide within a given time and under certain conditions, by jumping over London Bridge. (Is not diversity, in fact—if I may digress a moment—necessary in order to afford any kind of large conception of unity? The tree is made

up of diversities in root, trunk, branches, leaves. The diversity may simply be an indication of some conception of unity higher up. "The parts," says Aristotle, "which are to constitute a single organic whole must be different in kind." May not this, in fact, be a kind of philosophical basis* for the success of diversity in the British Empire? It is the diversity of freedom which produces the unity of ideal.) It may be permissible therefore to speak of the political aptitudes of a whole people, or the intellectual aptitudes of the narrower circle of schools and universities with which we are still more closely associated; and in particular to discuss our response to any given stimulus, provided that through the press or any other agency that stimulus is known, like the great war, to react upon the community as a whole.

Now if democracy is, as we believe, not merely a form of government but a *spirit*, the process of readjusting standards, it would seem, may well be determined by the stage of development to which as a people we have attained. One doubts if any part of the British Empire is in a better position than Manitoba during the last eighteen months to appreciate by actual demonstration some of the fundamental truths of democratic government. In the very nature of things in a democracy there can be no distinction safely permitted between public and private morality. We believe that in the long run we get the kind of administration that we deserve. On no other hypothesis would it be possible for moral and social progress to translate itself as it has already translated itself throughout our history, from the elder Pitt to Asquith, into better government. Even in our own day we get at least the kind of administration that

*In a paper on *The Integration of the Empire*, published since this address was given, Sir Harry Wilson, K.C.M.G., writes as follows: "The movement (for Imperial Federation) . . . is not one which can be unduly hastened. It may, indeed, almost be described as a cosmic process, an application to the domain of national affairs of that universal principle which Mr. Herbert Spencer defines in his sonorous way, as 'a change from an indefinite homogeneity to a definite heterogeneity, due to the continued integration of the differentiating parts which accompanies the continued integration of the aggregate which they form.'"

our public men *think* we deserve; and the honest administrators are to be pitied if they have not behind them an incorruptible electorate, to render unnecessary the thousand and one shifty expedients of the politician who feels that he is justified in distrusting the insistence or the integrity of public opinion. Men gather not figs of thistles. Have we a right to hope for freedom from humiliation and disappointment so long as we are content to relax an exacting and intelligent interest in public affairs beneath the soporific of self-interest?

We all in this western country accept the faith of intelligent democracy; but we ought to know that faith without works is dead. If second-hand ready-made opinions are accepted in an unquestioning and passive way; if in addition to a massive moral sense which we believe can be relied upon, on occasion at least, there is not a high moral sensitiveness—a continuous moral sense—a sensitiveness to clear thinking and to muddling as well as to right and wrong, it is surely reasonable to suppose that we shall not always be discriminating in our choice either of remedies or of public men. In fact would not an undisciplined democracy, even if it were ready to accept with alacrity the dogmas that we are apt so glibly and unreservedly to express, be subject particularly to two dangers? It might still persist in interpreting everything that is Prussian, whether it is an integral part of the Prussian system or not, as diabolical; in which case many a wise and admirable suggestion may be unreflectingly sacrificed, like seed in stony places, scorched by the sun. On the other hand the peculiar excellence of an autocratic system may appeal with especial force at such a time as this to an impulsive and undiscerning mind, and our glib democrat may be the very man to bow down before the brazen efficiency of materialism.

It is between these two extremes, in a spirit of patience and open-mindedness, that one looks for the trend of the future. Even in the logical applications of democratic government to problems of increasing scope and complexity, men are beginning to see that there are limitations which a sovereign common sense may induce us,

of our own accord, to impose upon our direct control. We are beginning to doubt whether we shall ever go back to the days of unqualified *laissez-faire* or to an extreme interpretation of individualism. Leaders in the best sense of the word have inspired the nation; and if one has followed closely in the British press the extraordinary transformation of Great Britain for purposes of war, it would almost seem that such leadership was demanded and evolved by a kind of unerring creative instinct within the democracy itself. There seems a reasonable assumption that, after all, that sort of public opinion can produce that sort of man. "Muddling through" we are beginning to hope, is an anachronism in our administration that is as susceptible to prevention as to cure. Even as thorough-going a Liberal of the old school as Sir Charles Lucas has emphasized the lesson that "obedience is necessary to existence," and that in order to command one must first learn to obey. However indispensable and invaluable, particularly in an educative way, may be our direct control of local affairs in time of peace, there is quickly reached a sphere where a discriminating choice of leadership—in fact a discriminating demand for leadership—is no less essential than an intelligent interest in the issues involved. Only a very simple and unreflecting people can be expected to be susceptible to the unctuous flattery that they themselves—millions of electors—are actually and directly ruling in a modern democracy, when the truth is that they have elected men whose duty it is to rule, and for that duty the electors have a right to hold those men responsible by the highest standards. It is a startling challenge to common sense when an unimpeachable democrat like Sir Charles Lucas recommends "strengthening the machinery which alone makes Democracy possible, the leadership of the few." In many of the functions of organized government, administration, if safeguarded by electoral control in the hands of an electorate of tried integrity, may come to be placed more and more unreservedly in the hands of trusted men who have inspired the confidence of the nation. It is worth reflection that demo-

cracies in the mass are not always the serenest judges even of peace and war in great crises. On at least one occasion war would almost inevitably have been precipitated between Great Britain and the United States had popular impulses in both countries not been restrained, and in fact thwarted, by the sane judgement and rugged moral courage of Lord Lyons and Abraham Lincoln.

Instead, therefore, of passively interpreting public opinion as they find it, our administrators may be expected to inform, to inspire, to lead public opinion, and even to interpret the inarticulate desires of a whole people. That this can and ought justly to be expected of public men seems capable of proof for two reasons. In the first place the period of scrutinizing opposition which nearly always precedes a man's rise to office, is so thorough and exacting a training that it gives a public minister an immeasurably better grasp of practical issues than the average elector can hope to possess; and in the second place the minister is in a position, as the average elector is not, to choose his associates on political grounds and to discuss political problems at all times with the best-informed opinion in the country. If a democracy comprising millions of electors is found through the scope and complexity of modern policy to require government by experts, no false modesty on the part of administrators and above all no flattering unction of fictitious power on the part of the electorate should deflect that democracy from their right to demand expert service—and guidance, if need be—from their elected representatives.

Herein, it seems to me, if this forecast is sound, lies the danger of the future; for if nothing but the patient work of education in a sense of public duty can protect the public—or even the public man himself—from the corrupt practices which are inseparable from an uninformed and negligent electorate, it follows that in this new tendency the ultimate responsibility of the electorate will increase with accelerated rapidity. Every stage in the process of self-renunciation and discipline by the people in the interests of expert administration must be marked not by less but by disproportionately closer

scrutiny—by immeasurably more insistent and exacting a public interest than before. The penalties of anything lower than incorruptibility and eternal vigilance will increase in geometrical ratio; and we are brought back again to the elementary truths of successful democratic government; the fact that in the long run we get about the kind of administration that we deserve. Responsibility for public measures will still rest with the ministers and can be enforced in the end, we know, by an intelligent and exacting electorate in our system of responsible government; responsibility for the system itself must rest to an increasing degree with ourselves, and that can be enforced in the last resort only by our suffering the penalties which any failure on our part to meet that responsibility will inevitably entail—and indeed will very justly deserve. Only so are we goaded on to progress. After all, the kind of irresponsible government in which the electorate itself feels no responsibility would surely be the worst. Our long fight for responsible government, in fact, has only shifted irresponsibility one stage further away from administration. Instead of allowing the executive to remain irresponsible, we have fastened responsibility upon Cabinet Ministers only to leave the electorate without any actionable responsibility whatever. We can punish a minister for maladministration in office. We cannot punish an elector for voting to keep that man in office in spite of his maladministration. Our safety will lie more than ever not in any species of "Morrison's pill"—to use Carlyle's phrase—not in any short cuts to administrative honesty, leaving the moral sense of the electorate in affairs of state to atrophy—as it has atrophied in Germany—by disuse; but in the old remedy—or rather the old hygiene—without which in the very nature of things we shall never attain to political health: the patient work of education in the quiet discipline of duty and self-sacrifice. It is the duty of the administrator to be honest; it is our duty to make it pay for him to be honest. Without the incentive to heroism in war we shall require in peace the self-sacrifice of war and its fidelity. The nation, we are told, has gone back to

Wordsworth for the note which inspired Britain during the long struggle against Napoleon; it may well find there, it seems to me, in the name of Duty, as clear and concise a gospel as one could wish to find for the guidance of a democracy in days of peace:

Give unto me, made lowly wise,
The spirit of self-sacrifice;
The confidence of reason give;
And in the light of Truth thy bondman let me live.

THE EDUCATIONAL OUTLOOK

The influences at work upon the educational outlook of the nation would seem to be less subtle; at least these can scarcely be said to have been less unreservedly discussed. We are on the whole, I hope, an open-minded people, and by the course of the war hitherto, the unfamiliar excellencies of an alien system have been forced upon us much more noticeably than the neglected virtues of our own. The reasons for this, I think, are more than usually cogent. The excellencies of a highly organized system of centralized control in time of war are obvious to all; the faults, however intolerable to free men in time of peace, are even yet to us obscure, and one must wait patiently to see whether as we are inclined to believe the next twenty-four months will prove an object-lesson in the unsoundness of an autocracy under defeat and disaster. On the other hand the faults of our own system are patent to the chronic grumbler, while the fundamental excellencies are less obvious and are clearly seen only in the last resort; and for this reason, that the resolution of the nation, instead of being irremediably broken with the mistakes of their leaders, grows with responsibility, and this responsibility comes ultimately to be felt and shouldered by the whole people. For the one system success is indispensable and disaster a veritable poison, cumulative in its results; for the other, success is some-

times brought nearer through temporary failure, and even disaster may prove a veritable tonic.

But even if the prodigies of German *Kultur* and organization come to be dissipated in defeat and disaster, it will be impossible to forget the remarkable achievement of a democracy in creating in two years perhaps the best-equipped army in Europe. Already the industrial organization of the country for war, supplemented—though not directly aided—by the skilful patient system by which British sea power is being used to strangle the resources of the enemy, is suggesting a similar system of organized industry, dominated by the trained expert and fed by all the suddenly revealed resources of technical training and applied science. That this idea will be found to dominate the immediate future seems to be indicated by rapidly increasing evidence; and already the extremists on both sides are beginning to discuss the new conditions in terms of the old threadbare controversy between science and the humanities, either side belabouring the other as though their aims were by their very nature mutually antagonistic.

The extremist in one direction dwells upon the amazing thoroughness of German "penetration" in matters of industry and trade, and above all upon the almost incredible details of organization to which the German people have profitably submitted in this war. If his contention is not conceded he points to the results achieved by scarcely more than a year of British industrial organization for purposes of war, with revelations not only of untold resources in material but of untold resourcefulness in personnel. He suggests the obvious advantages—so obvious he believes as to be inevitable in practice—in the co-ordination of scientific knowledge and industry; in the gathering of accurate commercial intelligence in centres whence it can be readily circulated through every artery of industry and trade; in accentuating national rather than individual interests and in concentrating and directing those interests to the utmost by expert administration; in ensuring not only the prominence but the predominance of science and particularly of applied

science and of technical training in the educational life of the country.

The other extremist replies that this programme, if dominated by the spirit of war and of international hatred, would represent for the next generation scarcely less than a surrender of the intellectual initiative to the enemies of our civilization as we understand it. Even the success of such a policy, if unqualified by a reference to the past or to the ultimate future, might be found to run counter to many of the best traditions of our race. The most fundamental principle of our democracy has been the slow vindication of equitable law—freedom in its deepest sense—over irresponsible prerogative whether of monarchs or of classes or of special interests within the State. Our development in that sense has been a varying struggle from generation to generation towards some practical detail of fair play and just dealing between man and man, interest and interest; and if our plans for the future do not include the projection of that principle into international relationships, there seems no escape except by armed preparedness from the broken treaty, the pillaged neutral, the enthronement of brute force, physical or financial, above the moral order and human freedom.

He suggests that no prodigies of German organization can surpass the mobilization, without compulsion, of nearly eight millions of men and women—over four millions of them volunteers for active service at the front—who had been actuated in Britain not by industrial and political docility but by a sense of duty in a cause which we believe to be as wide as humanity itself. Even the achievements of German organization have exalted materialism above the spirit, and by inducing in those who controlled that vast machine something of the arrogant madness that the gods sometimes send as a prelude to destruction, have led indirectly to the most disastrous blunders of the war. Germans have been experts with machines, with organizations, with machine-like things; but they have scarcely distinguished themselves by their knowledge of mankind, and they committed the gravest

blunder of the war when they misjudged Britain. At first we thought it impossible that Germany actually expected her infamous proposal of August 1914 to be acceptable. After the authoritative announcement of a Cabinet Minister and of the Prime Minister himself, it is now impossible to doubt that the proposal was made deliberately and confidently. "Never," says Mr. Asquith, "even in the tangled and bungled web of German diplomacy has there been an error so crude in conception and so disastrously fatal to its authors." One is at a loss to understand how in view of the scientific and material advancement of Germany the temper of a whole people could ever have been so egregiously misjudged. We all erred before the war by refusing to believe the worst about the Germans; they blundered by refusing to believe the best about us. It would almost seem that the vengeance which defends the truth had been visited, even unto the third and fourth generation, upon those who have accepted the traditional aberrations of the German historian upon the spirit, the motives, the historical development, and the moral integrity of democratic England. Whatever requirements then there may be for the application of science to industry, and of exact centralized control to conditions of trade, to imagine British statesmen and thinkers discarding the admirable poise and prophetic vision which have marked their conduct of the issues of this war, in favor of a blind idolatry of machines, of transitory as distinct from durable advantages—of things apart from ideas—would be to imagine a defeat as humiliating and almost as disastrous for mankind as a defeat in arms.

If in this dialogue it would seem that the advocate for the humanities has been allowed, like Dr. Johnson's Whig dog, to come out on top, let us hasten to add that this is largely because any thoughtful man under present conditions must take the requirements of applied science for granted; and at first sight the conclusion to which it seems necessary to come in the interests of the nation is apt, when put down in black and white or expressed in such a way as this, to seem like the easy verdict re-

quired by peace at any price rather than the result of anything like deep conviction. It is the old commonplace that the truth lies between these extremes, and as nearly as possible midway between; and for this reason that the marked predominance of the one will lead to the definite subjection of the other, and neither one side nor the other could be sacrificed without serious danger to the nation. The cult of the humanities if unleavened by the vigorous tonic of practical affairs might degenerate into aestheticism, if not into the passive virtues of benevolent neutrality against injustice; whereas the worship of applied science and of technical training might degenerate into crass materialism, contemptuous alike of martyrdom and of failure. Nothing could keep both in efficiency more effectively than approximate equality in the life of the nation, the one inciting the other; keeping teeth and claws sharp, if necessary, at each other's expense. The equilibrium will conserve the maximum of both sets of virtues, while the extremists may safely be left to demolish each other. After all is it not true that the best type of citizenship in the individual as well as in the nation as a whole requires both sets of virtues? At least is it not true that the frame of mind which can be receptive to both and can preserve the equipoise between them in the State, is that to which the destinies of a democracy can most safely be entrusted? In that sense any fundamental conflict between technical training and the humanities may well be non-existent. The question after all is not only what men do for a living but how they *live*; and if the tendencies which I have suggested for the years to come are once conceded, it may well become the duty both of the pure sciences and of the humanities to preserve the spirit which alone can lead to what Aristotle in the *Politics* has called—without the "smugness" which usually attaches to such a phrase in these days—the higher, or the noble, life. That spirit, it may be emphasized, is the spirit not of the narrow specialist but of the broad-minded free man; not of the professional but of the amateur; not of knowledge only but of wisdom; for knowledge after all is only the beginning of wisdom.

Neither the presence nor the absence of that spirit, it is needless to say, can be considered quite characteristic of any one study or pursuit in life. It may be admitted, for instance, that the graduate student who proposed a dissertation on the characteristic subjunctive in Livy gave promise of acquiring more knowledge than wisdom; one is inclined to think at least that he displayed more in his choice of a thesis. Similarly if technical education tends towards acquiescence in materialism, the remedy surely lies not in abolishing or indeed in curtailing technical education but in infusing into it something of the spirit. That, one is tempted to think, depends less upon the subject than upon the student and upon the teacher. Without doubt some subjects lend themselves readily to perversion for purely materialistic ends, but it is only by teachers and students prone to materialism that such perversion is inevitable. A man who is inspired by the right spirit will teach the humanities from the binominal theorem; will teach, if in no other way, by his own personality. A man whose eye is full of spiritual darkness will reduce to barren technicalities the poetry of Greece, the music of Beethoven, the profound teachings of Jesus.

May I try to avoid invidious comparisons by using the subject of history for an illustration? The value of historical training, it is to be hoped, is not merely in enabling one to produce from past experience cut-and-dried precedents for almost every emergency. Such a mechanical application of history would result in the perverted judgement of a Bernhardi. There are always variants in the equation. History never exactly repeats itself, though it is inconceivable that exactly similar causes should not produce exactly similar results. It is a knowledge and grasp of the *differences* as well as of the *analogies* of history which determines the soundness of one's judgement. The training in fact should serve not as a mechanical yard-stick but as a kind of instinct. A mechanic may make and understand every detail of an excellent rifle; but to bring down a bird on the wing requires eye and hand. A training in the humanities and history does not merely provide rules and maxims

all pigeon-holed for ready reference. It may suggest approximate analogies; but a man so trained in the humanities to think and to act humanely may be in a position to add just that indescribable something to exact knowledge that seems almost to amount to instinct. Here again it is not the narrow specialist who sees the wider vision. It is the spirit of the amateur and not of the professional, as Sir Gilbert Murray has pointed out, that brings feeling and understanding to the point of art.

Not even pure science, in fact, can successfully be what the name implies—mere *knowledge*. The scientist would probably be the first to protest against the limitation of his vision to the realm of concrete things; he no less than the philosopher and the historian is concerned not merely with *what* but with *how* and *why*. Knowledge is a trade, wisdom surely is an art; and it is to the pure sciences that one instinctively turns as mediators between the humanities on the one side and technical training on the other—to save the nation by their commanding influence over the applied sciences from the gross dangers of materialism, and to afford to the humanities the wholesome stimulating tonic of things visible. Ignore the individual aptitudes of the student, leave in abeyance the exercise of his judgement upon moral issues, make him into an expert instrument of the highest efficiency in a certain narrow field, and you have produced something, it has been indicated, which in a democracy as well as in an autocracy can be put to very ugly uses. Even so cautious and accurate an observer as Lord Cromer has pointed to "the extraordinary and tragic moral collapse of Germany," and has attributed it chiefly to a reliance upon the spirit which underlies purely utilitarian training.

And finally, is it not inevitable that these tendencies towards higher trust and more ample organization, both in the State itself and in the educational outlook at large, should effect profoundly the attitude of the University towards its constituency; or rather the attitude of the state or the province towards the University? It would be invidious to compare the relative capacities of the State University (so called) and the privately endowed

institution to respond to this impulse; but it seems as inevitable as to-morrow's sunrise that the demand for a wider service and the obligation to respond to all the needs—as far as these are national needs—of the province, will be felt as they have never been felt before. The University cannot be expected to rest content with being suspended between heaven and earth, like Mohammed's coffin, without a close articulation with the schools of the province on the one side and with the general life of the community on the other. One may venture at the outset to hope that we may be enabled to continue about this task in a sane quiet way without developing the unctuous and rather stereotyped phraseology so characteristic of uniformity and mechanical management. An institution like an individual has not got far in the wisdom of life if there remains unlearnt the simple lesson of humility and of service; but it is borne in upon one that the spirit may be lost in reiterated formalism, like the beauties of a fine line by too early and unintelligent memorizing.

It must have been self-evident long before the lessons of the war brought the duty into added prominence that various departments of the University had cognate functions which could never be discharged merely by academic teaching within the walls of the University itself. There is untold water-power for the electrician; there are the unexplored resources of the mine for the geologist, the collection of national archives for the student of history, the endless utilitarian services of social science. But whatever the direct contribution to the varied needs of the province, can there be anything, as a matter of fact, to compare in abiding influence with the type of citizenship that men and women develop here for every walk of life? I hope that remark will not pass merely as an appropriate rhetorical flourish. Is it not true that in the long run our success or failure will depend not upon inducing students by self-interest to come into the University but upon your *playing the game* when you go out; upon whether you are responsive to the obscure civic duties of the working day or trail along with others, exercising your citizenship only in the intervals of profit-

able self-interest? Above the gateway of an ancient school is still to be seen the mediaeval legend: "Manners makyth Man"—and the "Manners" of William of Wykeham mean not the nice adaptation of formal deportment to the social usages of a day but the tempering of the mind to self-reliance and chivalrous rectitude in all eventualities of life. What manners are to the individual, traditions may well be for the University. We serve the State, I cannot help thinking, in a way which will inevitably result in discord and disaster unless we learn here to taste the first-fruits of intellectual freedom and fair play for the convictions of others.

In that sense it may be doubted how far it is the duty of the University at all to yield to the seductive temptation of anything like partisanship in the purely political controversies of the State; and for this reason: political partisanship in practice necessitates extreme views in order to attain the golden mean. The aim is high to allow for wind and gravity. The radical and the tory between them hammer out the policy of the average man. One feels inclined to suggest that the function of the University is less to aid in the hammering than to induce the extremists to refrain from hammering the thing to pieces. Our duty would seem to be not to subscribe to extremes, even in order to reach the golden mean; but rather to get at the *truth*; to be *sound* intellectually first and then to be *just*; in other words to be free, for only "the truth shall make you free." To surrender one's mind to an indelible brand of partisanship—to pass under the yoke either to an interest or to the more insidious bondage of prejudice—would be to yield up one of the inestimable things of life if a man has once tasted the delights of intellectual freedom. Where could such stabilizing influences be developed more appropriately within a province than within a provincial University? And even if there is less here of the specious passing conflict, is there not at least scope for zeal, for courage, for service, in the manifold cause of truth? If once the mind is free,

Fishes that tipple in the deep
Know no such liberty.

Our traditions then as a University will be—will they not?—what we ourselves are. Be assured we shall be known for something in the province and among other universities, even if that something be only a kind of indescribable nothing in particular. We shall contribute in the future more, immeasurably more, directly to the economic and social life of the province. We may legitimately aspire to the confidence even of mutual enemies if without guile we meet our students and our fellow-citizens with an open mind; but above all will not the crucial test be whether with all our much serving we still search diligently for the truth? We may be "careful and troubled about many things; but one thing is needful." In fact upon further reflection is not this the test not only of a provincial University but of the province and of democracy itself; whether an institution supported by a community and responding freely to its demands, is found, amidst all the temptations towards materialism, towards formalism and mechanical organization, to be able to keep the lamp of the spirit still burning?

